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INTRODUCTION
SOL RUBIN*
I
On behalf of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency
(NCCD) and myself, I want to express at the outset my appreciation
for the recognition given A Model Act for the Protection of Rights of
Prisoners' (Model Act) by this symposium. In the minds of the mem-
bers of the committee that drafted the Model Act, the help that such
an act (or adoption of the procedures it recommends) affords prisoners
is the kind of help that also improves the penal system. By adminis-
trative action two states2 have adopted rules based on the Model Act.
Distinguished prison administrators were included on the commit-
tee3 that prepared the Model Act. Their role is perhaps better under-
stood if a brief explanation is given of the nature of the invitation to
* Counsel, National Council on Crime and Delinquency. LL.B., 1933, M.P.A.,
1950, New York University.
1. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRiME AND DELINQUENCY, A MODEL Acr FOR THE
PROTECTON OF RIGHTS OF PRIsoNERs (1972) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
2. See Kansas Department of Corrections, Policy, Guidelines and Procedures for
the Kansas Penal System (1972) (adopting the Model Act almost verbatim, with sup-
porting rules on discipline and grievances); New Mexico Department of Corrections,
Procedures, Rules and Regulations of the Classification Committee, Adjustment Com-
mittee, and Grievance Committee (1972). To date, no state has enacted a statute
based on the Model Act.
3. The following men comprised the Committee for a Model Act for the Pro-
tection of Rights of Prisoners [hereinafter referred to as the committee]:
1. Norman Carlson, Director, Bureau of Prisons, United States Department of
Justice
2. Major John D. Case, Warden, Bucks County Prison, Doylestown, Pennsylvania
3. Joseph S. Coughlin, Assistant Director, Illinois Department of Corrections
4. Walter W. Finke, Chairman of the Board, Dictaphone Corporation; Member,
Board of Trustees, NCCD
5. Dr. Peter Lejins, Director, Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Uni-
versity of Maryland
6. Richard A. McGee, President, American Justice Institute
7. Dr. Karl Menninger, The Menninger Foundation
8. Dr. Elmer K. Nelson, Director, School of Public Administration, University of
Southern California
9. Judge George H. Revelle, Superior Court, Seattle, Washington
10. Sol Rubin, Counsel, NCCD
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them, their interest in what was produced, and the purposes of the
Model Act.
NCCD has published a number of model legislative acts4 drafted by
its committees. Most of the acts are quite widely used. In most in-
stances committee members were selected simply for their expertise
in the subject area; there was no commitment to any principle in ad-
vance of the committees' work. This was true, for example, of the pe-
riodic revisions of the Standard Juvenile Court Act.5 Members of
those drafting committees were chosen because they were experienced
and able juvenile court judges, probation administrators, and so forth.
An example of a somewhat different operation is the Model Sentencing
Act,6 which was produced by NCCD's Council of Judges-a per-
manent body which has developed numerous standards and guides for
judges and other professionals in the corrections field.
The idea for a "model prisoner protection" statute was outlined in
advance in some detail by the NCCD staff, and submitted to the people
invited to serve on the committee. Their participation in the work
of the committee involved active assistance in implementing these origi-
nal ideas. Most members of the committee gave direct help in amplify-
ing and revising the original proposal and strengthening the rights of
prisoners as they were finally formulated.
A major input of ideas for the drafting of the Model Act was our
correspondence with prisoners and our contact with reform groups and
attorneys litigating or in other ways attempting to salvage some rights
of prisoners. On numerous occasions NCCD has criticized the style
of litigation for what seemed to be too limited an approach to the cor-
rection of specific problems. Individual prisoners, and even prisoner
groups, reflected the same limitation, as we saw it; they were con-
cerned with fairness and with due process, while our concern was that
litigation over due process is almost never-ending, and that even when
successful it does not always remedy prisoner abuse. Indeed, litigation
may fortify abuse by affording it greater "legality." This is also true
4. E.g., MODEL SENTENCING ACT (2d ed. 1972); STANDARD AcT FOR STATE COR-
RECnONAL SERvicES (1966); STANDARD JUVENIE COURT Acr (6th ed. 1959); STANDARD
FAmILY COURT AcT (1959); STANDARDS AND GUDEs FOR THE DETENTION OF CHILDREN
AND YOUTH (1958).
5. The Standard Juvenile Court Act was first published in 1925. The seventh
edition is in preparation.
6. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRM AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT
(2d ed. 1972).
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of almost all efforts to inject "treatment" and "rehabilitation" into
prisons.
Instead, we urged that in many instances abuse of a prisoner's rights
should result in the release of the prisoner, in the same way that a de-
fendant may be acquitted as a result of police abuse. Surely the prin-
cipal relief of habeas corpus is release.7
Although we were as concerned as others with fairness in procedure,
we also tried to support substantive amelioration in the Model Act. In
section 2, for example, certain things are simply prohibited-whipping,
for example, which is still legal in many jurisdictions, and any use of
physical force except in self-defense, in preventing an assault by one
prisoner on another, or in preventing escape.
Section 3 prohibits solitary confinement as disciplinary punishment.8
The prevalence of homosexual assaults in all institutions, men's and
women's, is a notorious violation of constitutional rights; we prohibit
such assaults.9 But merely prohibiting specific abuses is not sufficient
to ensure that prisoners will not be subjected to them. Even in the
cases that have held prison systems unconstitutional,'0 the prisons were
not closed; prisoners were permitted to be held under unconstitutional
conditions.
Our answer is provided in section 6, "Judicial Relief." Under this
section, illegal or unconstitutional conditions may not be continued
while efforts at correction, which may take months or years, are pre-
sumably made. The judge confronted with such conditions is expected
to exercise the power given him to "prohibit further commitments to
the institution," or, "if the abuses are found to be extensive and per-
sistent," to "order the institution closed subject to a stay of a reasonable
period, not to exceed six months, to permit the responsible authorities to
7. See generally Hopson, Courts, Corrections, and the Eighth Amendment: En-
couraging Prison Reform by Releasing Inmates, 44 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1060 (1971).
8. It is over six years since a landmark decision, Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.
Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966), applied the eighth amendment in condemning conditions
in solitary confinement. But the "hands-off" policy has still persisted. Enactment of
the Model Act would solve the problem quickly and decisively.
9. MODEL Acr § 2(c).
10. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), supplementing 300
F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth
ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971). The cases are discussed
in The Need for a Statute, in MODEL AcT 9, 11-12 [hereinafter cited and referred to as
Introduction]. See generally Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 175 (1970).
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correct the abuses," or, if the abuses are not corrected to his satisfac-
tion, to "order those prisoners who have a history of serious assaultive
behavior to be transferred to another facility;" finally, the judge may
"order the discharge of other prisoners."'"
The last section of the Model Act, "Visits to Prisoners and Institu-
tions," is an attempt to "break down the walls"-if not the walls of
the prisons, at least the walls between the prisons and the public.
Courts are again charged with enforcement; they may not keep "hands
off."
Is the Model Act a response to the massacre of prisoners and guards
at New York's Attica Prison? Although it was published after that
event, work on the Model Act had begun much earlier. It took no
great wisdom, but only a familiarity with the evils of prisons in the
United States, to see the need for such a statute. Attica was not its
cause, but demonstrated its need.
II
I would like to comment briefly on the articles in the symposium.
I find much of the material surprising, and therefore most illuminating
and instructive. I am sure that this opinion will be shared by the other
committee members, although I cannot speak for them.
Mr. Mann'2 suggests that the Model Act was addressed to courts,
rather than to prison administrators, where the real need is, and that
it should have sought to bolster programs of rehabilitation. My reply
is twofold. First, when we initiated this project, we decidedly avoided
any attempt to require programs of rehabilitation. We had done some-
thing of this kind in our Standard Act for State Correctional Services,
published in 1966; but by this time Milton Rector,'8 President of NCCD,
and I,1 and others on our staff, had despaired of making prisons viable
places of rehabilitation. We were getting closer to a position advocat-
ing the abolition of prisons, at least for all but a handful of dangerous
persons. This is now, in fact, the position of the Board of Directors
11. MODEL ACT § 6.
12. Mann, A Comment on the Model Act 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 617.
13. See Rector, Corrections in 1993, in GoALs FOR SocIA4 WEixP. L, 1973-1993
(H. Trecker ed. 1973).
14. See Rubin, Law and the Penal System, 15 CANADIN J. CRM. & COMrxoNs
59 (1973); Rubin, Developments in Correctional Law-From Abolition of the Death
Penalty to Abolition of Prisons, 19 CImE & DELINQuENcY 241 (1973).
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of NCCD. 15 Secondly, it is quite true that greater power resides in
prison administrators than in courts. That is precisely the problem-
administration is the actual source of the conditions in prisons, although
administrators can justifiably trace the source to conditions in our society.
Courts are severely limited in what they can do. But how change
administration-not by passing laws like the Standard Act for State
Correctional Services. As limited as their powers may be, courts do have
an impact on what is done to prisoners, and perhaps they induce some
change in attitude on the part of administrators. We attempted to give
courts exactly the kind of power-and prisoners the kind of rights-
that would be of that persuasiveness.
A second point made by several of the articles is that the Model Act
does not expand existing prisoners' rights. The committee did not
have to repeat rights now clearly recognized, such as prisoner access
to courts and religious equality. But we added several rights that
have not yet been established by statutes or judicial decisions. (Profes-
sor Jablonski'8 recognizes them, although he, too, feels we should have
gone further.) Most important of these are the powers to close institu-
tions and to enjoin further commitments to institutions that violate
prisoners' rights, whether established by constitution or by statute.1 7
Mr. Park observes that enactment of the Model Act would "not bring
about the liberal's dream of a 'nice prison' . .... 's If it is the lib-
eral's dream, it is definitely not the committee's, or NCCD's, or my
goal. And Mr. Park says the Model Act will not satisfy the "prison re-
former on the far left,"' 9 who believes that prisons and parole should
be abolished. Mr. Park correctly notes that the Model Act does not
strive for either of these objectives. And he sees the "correctional
conservative . . . angry with . . . the provisions reducing his power
to manage the prison as he sees fit,"20 noting, for example, that the
Model Act includes the "necessity [on the part of the warden] to permit
'any other citizen' to wander about the warden's turf with impunity."'
15. NCCD Board of Directors, The Nondangerous Offender Should Not be Im-
prisoned, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 365 (1973).
16. Jablonski, Controlling Discretionary Power in Prison Organizations: A Review
of the Model Act, 1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 563.
17. MODEL AcT §§ 6(c)-(d).
18. Park, On Being Medium Nice to Prisoners, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 607.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id., quoting MoDEL Acr § 7.
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Since he is apparently angry with such provisions, I assume Mr. Park
considers himself and other California wardens to be "correctional con-
servatives." In any event, in his "Section-by-Section Comments" he
explores provisions of the Model Act considered significant by the com-
mittee that he would not want enacted in California.
Mr. Park also says, "A serious criticism of the presentation of the
Model Act is that it strongly implies a promise that giving prisoners ad-
ditional rights will stop riots. 22 Standing alone, of course, it Will not.
Yet the Model Act does say, "Better writs than riots," and Mr. Park
acknowledges that the writ does substitute for the riot on occasion. A
group of West Virginia prisoners recently sued over conditions in their
prison; NCCD supported them in an amicus curiae brief, quoting the
Model Act. The trial court ruled in favor of the prisoners and sought
to correct the conditions they complained of. The West Virginia Su-
preme Court reversed;23 a riot followed.
Mr. Park's article is a fascinating contrast to Professor Cohen's.24 The
former views the Model Act as making unmanageable demands on
prison administrators; the latter's view is that "with but one or two ex-
ceptions its only appeal will be to prison officials fighting a rearguard
action against the further 'encroachment' of judicial decisions.!' 2" Mr.
Park's worries are, I think, a sufficient repudiation of that view.
Professor Cohen suggests that some provisions (concerning solitary
confinement, an ombudsman, and counsel representation in disciplinary
hearings, for example) could be strengthened. This is useful criticism,
the kind I (and I am sure some, if not all, members of the committee)
welcome. The invitation is extended to others to improve on the pro-
visions. I think we made a good start that will suffice until something
better comes along. But would Professor Cohen support legislation of
this kind, even with the improvements he recommends? Apparently not
-he concludes by wishing the Model Act had never been written. He
prefers to rely on litigation. Although he cites cases26 proscribing the
use of physical force against prisoners except for defensive or preventive
purposes, none is as specific as the provisions of the Model Act. He
cites the "ancient" (does he mean consistently observed?) principle that
22. Park, supra note 18, at 608.
23. State ex rel. Pingley v. Coiner, - W. Va. -, 181 S.E.2d 220 (1972).
24. Cohen, In Search of a Model Act for Prisoners' Rights, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q.
621.
25. Id.
26. See cases cited id. at 623 n.8.
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prison authorities are "under a duty to maintain the minimal condi-
tions necessary to sustain the life and health of prisoners."2 " But if
this implies that courts have enough to go on without legislation, he is
sadly mistaken.
Medical care in prisons, for example, is generally not treatment but
abuse, and as often as not the courts sustain the abuse.2 Another ex-
ample is the Model Act's provision for administrative responsibility to
protect prisoners against sexual assault.2 9 Hardly a prison today suc-
ceeds in providing this protection, and some judges have announced
that they refused to commit prisoners for exactly this reason. If this
section were enacted, and related to the provision for closing institu-
tions or barring commitments, does Professor Cohen think it would have
no significance for litigation?
The whole point of the Model Act is that it is a legislative approach
to reform. Legislatures are notoriously supportive of the power of ad-
ministrators, almost without restraint, and notoriously neglectful of the
rights and care of prisoners.80 What is needed is legislation like this,
or better than this. Professor Cohen declares that Coffin v. Reichard1
is old hat, but even today not all courts follow it. When the Supreme
Court of West Virginia handed down the decision noted above,32 re-
jecting prisoners' pleas for protection, it rejected Coffin v. Reichard
and cited instead Price v. Johnston.33 The Model Act would by statute
install the principle of Coffin v. Reichard.
Despite his preference for litigation, Professor Cohen is severely crit-
ical of the Model Act's failure to recommend a legislative rather than
an administrative disciplinary procedure.34 None of us proposed an
elaborate legislative model-and I would defend what we have done.
I think a legislative disciplinary procedure would be utterly inadequate,
given the past history of the state legislatures-with correction depart-
ments standing at their shoulders-on prisoners' rights. A legislative
27. Id. at 623.
28. See cases cited in Rubin, Developments in Correctional Law-From Abolition
of the Death Penalty to Abolition of Prisons, 19 CRImE & DELiNQtENCY 241 (1973).
29. MODEL ACT § 2(c).
30. See Rubin, Needed-New Legislation in Corrections, 17 CRUM & DELiN-
QuENcy 392 (1971).
31. 143 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
32. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
33. 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
34. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 623-24, 635-37.
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procedure would be less protective of prisoners' rights than one drafted
by prison administrators with prisoners, their organizations, and coun-
sel at the administrators' shoulders.
I have another basic objection to a complex disciplinary code, leg-
islative or administrative. As I said earlier, in consultations with at-
torneys representing prisoners I have urged that relief not dwell on pro-
cedural due process for the prisoners, just as I have urged that dwelling
on "treatment" resources is most unpromising. What I have urged is
that relief seek recognition of substantive rights, and that when these
rights are violated, prisoners be released. The Model Act goes along
that path.
In his introductory paragraph, Professor Cohen states: "[T]he Model
Act lacks even the 'menace of liberal reform.' "3 What is the "menace
of liberal reform?" Endless litigation over due process that, even if
won, fails to remedy abuses? The newer demand for "rehabilitation"
and "treatment" that is an endless bog? These are games for conserv-
ative correctional administrators; they do not help prisoners or reform
prisons. The prisons cannot be reformed by due process, just as capi-
tal punishment was not so reformed, but had to be abolished. The
Model Act does not attempt to reform the prisons; it opens the door
to the widest possible visitation and litigation to close prisons, and to
prohibit further commitments.
Professor Jablonski finds considerable merit in the Model Act. He
acknowledges that it provides at least a beginning; he opens with the
words, "The [Model Act] is designed to establish law where presently
there is little." 36 He then suggests provisions that could, and perhaps
should, be added. This is very thoughtful and constructive. But there
is a misunderstanding. I reiterate what is stated in the Introduction87
-the Model Act does not undertake to regulate the operation of prisons
by statute. Apparently misapprehending thfis, Professor Jablonski says
that the Model Act is at fault in requiring that "a prospective visitor
must 'establish a legitimate reason for such a visit' simply to make an
application. '38  This is not so-the passage refers to visiting by the
general population other than attorneys, relatives, or friends, whose
visiting must be authorized by administrative rules that the Model Act
35. Id. at 621.
36. Jablonsk, supra note 16, at 563.
37. Introduction 13-14.
38. Jablonski, supra note 16, at 592, quoting MODEL AcT § 7.
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does not spell out. 9 In addition, others who can establish a legitimate
reason-obviously including the press and many citizens' groups, as
Mr. Park is well aware-can have their right to visit mandated by a
court. There is nothing remotely resembling this in legislation today,
or in judicial decisions thus far.
Finally, I defend the Model Act as contributing far more than the
criticism, particularly that of Professor Cohen, allows. Professor Cohen
writes, "I suspect that Rubin was simply overruled by other members
of the committee on key issues."4  Not a bit. When we had our
wrap-up committee meeting to review the fourth or fifth draft, there
was no conflict within the committee, and none between me-either
in my personal views or in my representation of NCCD--and other
members of the committee. I trust the foregoing explains why I am
dismayed that liberal reformers, for whom Professor Cohen apparently
speaks," fail to support a model act that if enacted would open the
way to accomplishing more substantial change in the prison system
than years of litigation.
39. See MODEL AcT § 7.
40. Cohen, supra note 24, at 629.
41. Professor Herman Schwartz, Counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union's
National Prisons Project, and a member of the Board of Directors of the New York
Civil Liberties Union, in a recent article similarly dwelled almost entirely on litigation
as the path to prison reform. He is a defeatist on legislative reform: "Legislators
and administrators will not move until forced to by the courts." Schwartz, Whither
Penal Reform?, in CIVL Lm.Rnus IN NEw YoRK 11 (1973). The statement is in-
correct if it is meant to imply that legislatures move progressively in penal reform as a
result of court action; but they would move if reform groups worked for sound legisla-
tion.
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